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The writing assignment of the Utrecht University master program in neuroscience and cognition is a test of writing ability; a way to prove that one can properly review relevant literature and draw valid conclusions from previous scientific endeavors. This does not mean I chose just any topic for this assignment. I wanted to write about cognitive dissonance, a function of the mind that has fascinated me since my bachelor-level psychology courses. In this paper, I aim to review the psychology and neuroscience behind cognitive dissonance, and investigate its role in a mental disorder that affects millions around the world: posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
	By combining cognitive and neuroscientific knowledge on dissonance reduction and PTSD, I hope to reach new insights into the cognitive and neurological factors that influence the course of PTSD in an individual. The leading hypothesis in this study is: the way people process cognitive dissonance predicts PTSD treatment outcome.
Summary for the lay audience
Humans love consistency. We enjoy an orchestra that plays in perfect harmony, we furbish our house with furniture that fits together and we dress such that our pants match our jacket. In much the same way, we seem to value consistency in our thinking and behavior. Our opinions, attitudes and actions often exist in clusters that are internally consistent. This consistency brings order to our lives, and order gives us a sense of control. Controlling our environment is something we seem to find very important.
	Of course, there are many exceptions. A person who is a fan of the singer Madonna may dislike her latest album, someone who smokes may nonetheless be aware of health risks associated with his habit and a supporter of Barack Obama may disagree with this president’s policy on the use of military drones. When such a contradiction appears in our mind, we experience what scientists call cognitive dissonance. You could describe this as a negative feeling, a kind of uneasiness that arises when we contradict ourselves in one way or another.
	Veterans who experienced atrocities in a war zone often experience posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This means that they relive their traumatic experiences, are anxious, are more easily aroused than other people and try to avoid thinking about the events that gave them the disorder. They experience their own form of cognitive dissonance: they find it incredibly difficult to know that terrible things happen in a world that they want to believe is fair.
	One way to respond to such a contradiction is to justify what happened. You may know the Stockholm syndrome: in the 1970s a bank robbery in Stockholm caused some people to be held hostage for over five days. After the situation was over, the hostages did not hate the robbers, they started defending them in public! One hostage even got engaged to one of the robbers. Clearly, they re-interpreted the terrible thing that had happened to them: they justified the experience. In this way, they could still believe that all was right with the world.




1. Cognitive Dissonance Theory

An hungry Fox with fierce attack / Sprang on a Vine, but tumbled back,
Nor could attain the point in view, / So near the sky the bunches grew.
As he went off, ‘They're scurvy stuff,’ / Says he, ‘and not half ripe enough--
And I 've more rev'rence for my tripes / Than to torment them with the gripes.’
For those this tale is very pat / Who lessen what they can't come at.
- Aesop​[1]​

Humans love consistency. We enjoy an orchestra that plays in perfect harmony, we furbish our house with furniture that fits together and we dress such that our pants match our jacket. In much the same way, we seem to value consistency in our thinking and behavior. Our opinions, attitudes and actions often exist in clusters that are internally consistent. This consistency brings order to our lives, and order gives us a sense of control. Controlling our environment is something we seem to find very important.
	Of course, there are many exceptions. A person who is a fan of the singer Madonna may dislike her latest album, someone who smokes may nonetheless be aware of health risks associated with his habit and a supporter of Barack Obama may disagree with this president’s policy on the use of military drones. Still, the reason these conflicting attitudes stand out is their sharp contrast with the consistency people usually exhibit.
	According to Festinger’s (1957) Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, inconsistent thoughts or actions cause “psychological discomfort”, dissonance (see box 1), interpreted by later researchers as a state of negative affect described by words like uncomfortable, uneasy and bothered (Elliot & Devine, 1994). Instead of thoughts and actions, researchers of cognitive dissonance speak of cognitions or cognitive elements, which encompass thoughts, opinions and attitudes but also output of behavioral systems, insofar as we can have cognitions (knowledge) about our behavior (Draycott & Dabbs, 1998).
	The main tenet of cognitive dissonance theory is that humans are motivated to reduce dissonance by reconciling inconsistency (discrepancy, see box 1) between their cognitions, just as anyone is motivated to reduce hunger or frustration. And so, the smoker who experiences discrepancy between his knowledge of his own behavior and his knowledge of the harmful effects of cigarettes is motivated to stop smoking, or to rationalize his behavior by arguing that (a) smoking feels so good that it is worth the risks; (b) the negative effect on his health is not as great as people are making it out to be; or (c) one can’t avoid every risk and still live a comfortable life (Festinger, 1957).

Formal definition of cognitive dissonance
Formally, two cognitions are consistent if one follows from the other, and they are discrepant if the obverse (opposite) of one follows from the other (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999, p3). For example, if a person were already in debt and also purchased a new car, the corresponding cognitive elements would be in discrepancy with one another, as not buying a new car would follow from being in debt (Festinger, 1957).
	In this example, buying a new car may also be in discrepancy with other cognitions, such as the belief that new cars are environmentally unfriendly or old-timers are more desirable than new cars. It may also be consistent with some cognitions, such as the opinion that a new car is a good investment or the knowledge that a new car is needed to transport oneself to work or a holiday location.
	If the person does not care much about the environment, the discrepant cognition that new cars are environmentally unfriendly will not have a large effect on the dissonance this person is experiencing. Conversely, other cognitions may be very important to the person, causing them to have great influence on the total amount of cognitive discrepancy the person is experiencing from the interplay between the cognition in question and cognitions in consistency or discrepancy with it. Thus, the magnitude of discrepancy caused by one cognition depends on the number and importance (weight) of consistent and discrepant relations between this cognition and all related cognitions. This can be expressed in the following equation.


Equation 1. The total amount of discrepancy cause by cognition A. D is the sum of cognitions discrepant with cognition A and C is the sum of cognitions consistent with cognition A, with each cognition weighted for importance (Harmon-Jones, Amodio & Harmon-Jones, 2009).

People can experience discrepancy and dissonance from different sources at the same time, and the influence of one case of discrepancy on the total amount of dissonance experienced by a person can vary (Schultz & Lepper, 1996; Harmon-Jones, Amodio & Harmon-Jones, 2009). Buying a new car is an important decision for most of us, so if this decision results in discrepancy, the negative influence of that discrepancy on our psychological comfort will be great. Buying a new pencil sharpener when one is in debt, however, may lead to large discrepancy at the cognition level, but will lead to a minor increase in total dissonance experienced, as it is hardly important to an individual’s life.
Discrepancy can be reduced by decreasing the number or importance of discrepant cognitions, and by increasing the number or importance of consistent cognitions. How discrepancy actually gets reduced depends on the resistance to change of individual cognitions, with less resistant cognitions more likely to change (Shultz & Lepper, 1996). According to Harmon-Jones et al. (2009, p.121), knowledge about recent behavior is usually assumed to be the cognition most resistant to change.
Experimental paradigms of cognitive dissonance
Experimental paradigms invoking dissonance are often divided into three categories: insufficient justification, free choice and belief disconfirmation (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999; Draycott & Dabbs, 1998). These categories will be outlined here. Note that this list is not exhaustive. It merely describes the most common experimental paradigms in the study of cognitive dissonance.

Insufficient justification
If a reward is insufficient to justify a person’s behavior, he is likely to change his attitudes towards the behavior in order to avoid cognitive dissonance. In other words, if there are not enough consistent cognitions to explain a person’s behavior, he will create more of such cognitions, or increase the importance of previously existing ones. For example, subjects who were paid $1 to lie that a boring task they had just performed was actually interesting subsequently rated the task as more interesting than subjects who were paid $20 (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Exploring punishment rather than reward, a study by Aronson & Carlsmith (1963) showed that children disliked a particular toy more if they were given a mild threat not to play with it than if they were given a strong threat.
	Note that the value of money is strictly defined, which makes the reward cognition in the Festinger & Carlsmith (1959) study difficult to change to resolve cognitive discrepancy: one cannot simply create a belief that $1 is in fact enough money to justify lying. As a result, attitudes towards behavior had to be changed. In another study, participants who had to go through an embarrassing initiation to join a group rated the group as more attractive than controls with an easy initiation (Aronson & Mills, 1959). In this case, as “with increasing severity of initiation it [became] [...] difficult to believe that the initiation was not very bad” (Aronson & Mills, 1959), it was easier for the participants to alter their attitude towards the reward (i.e. being part of the group) than to change their attitude towards the behavior (going through the initiation). This illustrates how the cognition that changes is the cognition least resistant to change (Shultz & Lepper, 1996).
	Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999) separate effort-justification paradigms, in which a varyingly unpleasant effort needs to be made to obtain a particular outcome, from induced-compliance paradigms, in which a constant effort needs to be made to obtain a varyingly satisfactory outcome. On the level of cognitions, however, these two categories converge: they both invoke dissonance through situations in which the value of the outcome of a behavior is not enough to justify the behavior itself.
	Opposing insufficient justification there is the overjustification effect: if a person’s behavior can be justified mostly or solely by an extrinsic motivation (e.g. money), there is no need for intrinsic motivation (i.e. attitudes favoring the behavior). As a result, intrinsic motivation can decrease when a great extrinsic motivation is given for a person’s behavior (Lepper et al., 1973; Deci, 1972).

Free choice
Making choices, in any context, can quickly lead to cognitive discrepancy, cognitive dissonance and cognitive dissonance reduction. A person’s knowledge about a recent choice is discrepant with any negative cognition about the chosen alternative and with any positive cognition about all rejected alternatives. In free choice paradigms, researchers have shown that people reduce dissonance by “downplaying” such cognitions, i.e. making them seem less important.
	In 1956, Brehm was the first to show this effect: women who made a decision between two products were more positive about the chosen product and less positive about the rejected product than before they made their choice. This effect was stronger if the two alternatives were initially close in desirability than if they were not close in desirability (Brehm, 1956).
	Chen and Risen (2010) recently pointed out a serious methodological problem in free-choice paradigms of cognitive dissonance. Because there is self-selection in such paradigms, they argue, the spreading of alternatives (i.e. the increase in difference between participants’ evaluations of the alternatives after they make their choice) could be due to pre-existing preferences. However, controlling for such a self-selection effect, Izuma et al. (2010) still found that the mere act of making a choice can change self-report preference as well as its neural representation (as detailed in chapter 2).

Belief disconfirmation
If people encounter information discrepant with one of their beliefs, they have several options to avoid or reduce dissonance. They can, of course, abandon their belief, thereby reducing the number and/or importance of discrepant cognitions, but this may be problematic, as a belief switch can arouse new discrepancy between the changed belief and behavior corresponding to the original belief.
	A second option is to avoid discrepancy by misperceiving or misinterpreting the discrepancy-inducing information, reducing the number of discrepant cognitions, and/or reducing the importance of discrepant cognitions (downplaying them). A third option is to create more or stronger cognitions in favor of the existing belief, which is what subjects did in a study of belief disconfirmation carried out by Festinger and colleagues (1956).
	In this study, a group had become committed to the prophecy that a flood would engulf the American continent on a specific date in the near future. The group believed that this information was transmitted to the leader of the group by extraterrestrial beings. These beings, it was prophesied, would come to earth in a flying saucer and rescue only the group from the catastrophic flood.
	When the group’s belief was disconfirmed on the predicted date of the flood, cognitive discrepancy set in. Different members of the group responded differently to the subsequent state of cognitive dissonance: those members that were waiting for the flood alone did not maintain their beliefs, but members who were waiting amongst other members did. Arguably, the members waiting alone could more easily let go of their belief in the flood than the members who felt social pressure to maintain their original attitudes.
	The leader of the group adapted her beliefs to match information from the real world: she stated that God prevented the flood because of the group’s existence as a force for good. And interestingly, the group started proselytizing their message more intensively than before their belief disconfirmation. In terms of cognitive dissonance theory, the group created more and stronger cognitions consistent with their existing belief, so as to reduce the total magnitude of discrepancy (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999).
Why do we experience dissonance?
Festinger made no claim as to why cognitive dissonance occurs: he simply noted that cognitive dissonance is motivational (Harmon-Jones et al., 2009). Other researchers have doubted whether the reduction of cognitive discrepancy is the result of a motivational at all. Bem (1967) proposed that attitude change was due to self-perception, and Tedeschi and colleagues (1971) proposed that it was due to managing one’s impressions to others. These cold, purely cognitive interpretations do, however, not account for the findings that cognitive discrepancy can cause negative affect and increased (sympathetic) bodily arousal, as measured with electrodermal activity (Harmon-Jones et al., 2009).
	More motivational interpretations of cognitive dissonance have taken the theory from a basic incompatibility of cognitions to more high-level, complex processes. For instance, Aronson’s (1969) self-consistency theory states that dissonance only occurs when a person acts in violation of his or her own self-concept. This theory, however, implies that people with high self-esteem should respond to cognitive discrepancy with more dissonance reduction than people with low self-esteem; this prediction has enjoyed only partial support (Harmon-Jones et al., 2009). Moreover, self-related models of dissonance imply that people or animals experiencing dissonance must have a developed self-concept. Egan, Santos and Bloom (2007) undermined this prediction, finding cognitive dissonance effects in 4-year-old humans and capuchin monkeys.
	Harmon-Jones et al. (2009) and Draycott & Dabbs (1998) conclude that although self-aspects and other “special cases” (e.g. responsibility for cognitive discrepancy, aversive outcomes of behavior) appear to influence cognitive dissonance processes, they are not necessary to cause discrepancy or dissonance.




2. Neural systems underlying cognitive discrepancy, dissonance and attitude change
Various neural systems have been linked to cognitive discrepancy, dissonance and attitude change processes. In this chapter, an overview will be given of brain areas associated with cognitive dissonance processes. Their tentative functions will be integrated at the end of the chapter.
Frontostriatal circuits: tracking preference for alternatives
It has been established that frontostriatal circuits are involved in the brain’s valuation system; activity in the ventral striatum, the hippocampus and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is correlated with the value a person assigns to a stimulus (Lebreton et al., 2009).
	To test a generalization of this function of the striatum to cognitive dissonance processes, Izuma and colleagues (2010) tracked changes in activity in the anterior striatum during a free choice paradigm. Participants inside an fMRI scanner were reminded that they had previously rejected a food item they liked (in a situation where they had to make the difficult choice between two equally liked foods), and were asked to rate it again. The predicted spreading of alternatives occurred: it was found that preference for those items rejected during difficult choices was significantly reduced, even after controlling for the possible confounds indicated by Chen and Risen (2010).
	Importantly, it was also found that this choice-induced preference change was mirrored in anterior ventral striatum activity (Izuma et al., 2010). Similarly, Sharot and colleagues (2009) found that caudate nucleus activity tracks choice-induced preference change. This means that preference change in a cognitive dissonance paradigm is not just a self-report phenomenon (that could be explained at a high level by, for example, Aronson’s self-consistency theory), but that it is observable as changes in brain activation as well (Izuma et al., 2010).
	Izuma and colleagues (2010) also found other regions correlating with subjects’ self-reported preferences, but only the striatum showed the predicted pattern of preference change. The authors postulated that the other regions involved (vmPFC, rostral ACC and more) relate to other variables inherent to the stimuli used (e.g. arousal). It is likely that activity change in these areas during preference change can be ascribed to the function of these areas in cognitive dissonance reduction itself, instead of in the representation of preference.
Anterior cingulate cortex: detecting discrepancy and generating dissonance
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been found to be involved in the detection of situations in which cognitive conflict is likely to occur (Carter et al., 1998). The ACC gives rise to the error-related negativity, an event-related potential that has been found to signal conflicts between behavior and self-concept (Amodio et al., 2004). Based on these findings, Harmon-Jones (2004) predicted that the ACC should be involved in cognitive dissonance processes as well, as a monitoring unit for higher-level conflict like cognitive discrepancy.
	This prediction was confirmed by several studies. In a Solomun four-group design (controlling for effects of pre-test attitude scoring), Van Veen et al. (2009) found that cognitive discrepancy in an insufficient justification paradigm engaged the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and the anterior insula. Activity in these areas predicted the magnitude of the participants’ subsequent attitude change. Izuma et al. (2010) found that the ACC and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex tracked the degree of cognitive discrepancy (as calculated based on self-reported attitudes) on a trial-by-trial basis.
	Harmon-Jones et al. (2009) argue that the ACC can account for both cognitive discrepancy and dissonance: it detects cognitive error, but can also give rise to responses of the autonomic nervous system, such as heightened electrodermal activity (Hajcak et al., 2003).
	The function of the anterior cingulate cortex in cognitive dissonance processes is analogous to its function in foraging behavior. Kolling and colleagues (2012) propose that in such food-searching behavior, the ACC compares the value of presently available food items to the average value of foods in the wider environment and the costs of obtaining these. In other words, the ACC is thought to make sure that the behavioral choice of engaging in a presently available food option does not conflict with knowledge about the environment, for example when it is known that the environment holds much more valuable foods. This process could be seen as a cognitive dissonance process and is in line with the action-based model of dissonance: it seems to help the animal in maintaining coherent action tendencies, leading to concrete survival benefits (Kolling et al., 2012; Harmon-Jones, 1999).
Anterior insula: from discrepancy to dissonance
As stated above, Van Veen and colleagues (2009) found that cognitive discrepancy in an insufficient justification paradigm lead to significantly heightened activity in bilateral anterior insula. The authors suggest that these regions may give rise to the negative affect known as cognitive dissonance. This suggestion fits a wealth of functional insights about the bilateral anterior insula: these regions are thought to form key integration centers of motivational autonomic brain-body loops (Craig, 2002; Damasio & Carvalho, 2013) and are involved in processing emotions (Pollatos, Gramann & Schandry, 2007; Harrison, Gray, Gianaros & Critchley, 2010) such as disgust (Wicker, Keysers, Plailly, Royet, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 2003).
	As Craig (2002) points out, an emotion consists of a feeling and a corresponding motivation. In this light, it is not surprising that the negative emotional state called dissonance motivates one to reduce discrepancy. Just as disgust makes one want to expel something nasty from the digestive system, dissonance makes one want to get rid of contradictory cognitions. According to Craig (2002), however, the insula is generally only responsible for the “feeling” aspect of an emotion, and the ACC takes care of the motivational aspect accompanying it (Craig, 2002, p.662). One could therefore argue that the anterior insula only subserves the negative affective state we call dissonance, leaving the motivational facet to other neural systems.
Frontal cortex: from dissonance to attitude change
Jarcho and colleagues (2011) monitored brain activity during a free-choice paradigm of cognitive dissonance. They questioned the often-used description of attitude change in such a paradigm as “post-decisional” and predicted instead that attitude change takes place within seconds after the generation of cognitive dissonance. Their findings seem to confirm this hypothesis: it was found that attitude change (as measured by the spreading of alternatives) in participants choosing between two similarly liked paintings or names was positively associated with activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the medial prefrontal cortex, the precuneus, the ventral striatum and the parahippocampal gyrus already during the decision-making process. Activity in the bilateral anterior insula and lateral parietal cortex was negatively correlated with attitude change, which supports the view that anterior insula activity correlates with the current amount of cognitive dissonance.
	Jarcho et al. (2011) suggest that the right IFG may be involved in downregulation of distress or arousal responses of the anterior insula, via selection of more decision-consistent interpretations of the stimuli. Interestingly, a functional connectivity analysis of the anterior insula showed that the time course of activity of a cluster in the right IFG was negatively correlated with the time course in left-anterior insular cortex, and more strongly so during trials with large compared to small amounts of attitude change (Jarcho et al., 2011).
	These findings are reminiscent of models of emotion regulation, in which reappraisal of threats is associated with relief from psychological distress, activity in the IFG and downregulation of limbic responses (Berkman & Lieberman, 2009). Extrapolating this finding to cognitive dissonance reduction, Jarcho and colleagues (2011) suggest that the right IFG could both facilitate a shift towards decision-consonant cognitions and modulate arousal activity in the anterior insula. Just as the ACC can account for both the detection of cognitive discrepancy and the generation of dissonance, the right IFG could be responsible for reduction of cognitive discrepancy and the downregulation of dissonance.
	Some questions remain: how does the inferior frontal gyrus select decision-consistent interpretations of the stimuli at hand? How is one cognition, be it conscious or unconscious, selected over another, and how are stimuli reappraised? If cognitive control is involved, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex may play an important role. This area is known to implement control in tasks like the Stroop task (MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger & Carter, 2000), in which two contradictory cognitions and behavior intentions are present in the mind at once. In the case of the Stroop task, like in other cognitive discrepancy paradigms, the anterior cingulate cortex was found to monitor conflict and performance (MacDonald et al., 2000). More research is needed to provide a proper neuroscientific explanation of attitude change.
Toward an integrative neural model of cognitive dissonance
The current knowledge of the neural foundations of cognitive dissonance reduction may be summarized as follows:
	When two cognitions are discrepant, the anterior cingulate cortex detects this inconsistency. An autonomous physiological response sets in, and the anterior insula generates a negative affective state. Frontal cortical regions respond to the discrepancy and dissonance, and, motivated to achieve relaxation of the generated emotional state, select consistent cognitions over discrepant ones. As a result, preference for alternatives in a free-choice paradigm may change, which is reflected by ventral striatum activity.
	There are several parts of the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance that are not yet matched by a neuroscientific explanation. For one, we have seen that resistance to change is an important concept in cognitive dissonance reduction. How is this cognitive stubbornness coded in the brain? Does it rely on memory processes, that cause some cognitions to be lodged inside the mind more firmly than others (Hebb, 1949; McGaugh, 2013)? And what is the neurological role of emotional “tagging” of cognitions (LeDoux, 1993) in this battle of attitudes? These questions should be answered in the domain of cognitive neuroscience, as part of its duty of filling in the still intuitive divide between (social) psychology and neurophysiology.


3. The role of cognitive dissonance in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
Posttraumatic stress disorder
People who are exposed to a traumatic event – actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence – are at risk of developing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This mental disorder is characterized by four types of symptoms: reexperiencing the event through unwanted recollection of the incident; avoidance of things that remind the person of the event; negative changes in cognitions and mood associated with the traumatic incident; and increased physiological arousal (table 1; American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
	PTSD may occur among (but is not limited to) combatants or civilians exposed to war, victims of domestic abuse and people involved in severe motor vehicle accidents (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). All symptoms can occur in different forms; for example, a war veteran may experience a nightly raid through flashbacks, while a rape victim might have nightmares related to the traumatic event.

Table 1. Diagnostic criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder
A. Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence (the trauma).
B. Presence of intrusion symptoms associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning after the traumatic event(s) occurred (reexperiencing).
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning after the traumatic event(s) occurred (avoidance).
D. Negative alterations in cognitions and mood associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning or worsening after the traumatic event(s) occurred (negative mood).
E. Marked alterations in arousal and reactivity associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning or worsening after the traumatic event(s) occurred (arousal).
F. The disturbance (marked by the symptoms of reexperiencing, avoidance, negative mood and arousal) lasting for more than 1 month.
G. The disturbance causing clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
H. The disturbance not being attributable to the physiological effects of a substance (e.g., medication, alcohol) or another medical condition.
Criteria adapted from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed. (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Cognitive discrepancy in PTSD
Young (1997) suggests that victims of posttraumatic stress disorder experience great amounts of cognitive discrepancy. Someone who has seen terrible things in an otherwise orderly world often has a difficult time reconciling their experience with their belief in a humane society. Some Vietnam veterans, Young (1997) describes, experienced “a loss of ontological security that was traced to the veterans’ inability to reconcile their traumatic memories of Vietnam (often involving atrocities) with their cognitive schemas, the moral codes, self-concepts, beliefs about human nature, and notions of cosmic justice through which these men attempted to impose a sense of order and meaning on the world” (p.8).
	The cognitive discrepancy common to people who suffer from PTSD leads to dissonance when these patients reexperience or remember the traumatic event (Cantor & Price, 2007). A wife who has been beaten by her husband may be unable to explain to herself why she stayed with him even though the abuse kept going, or she might find it hard to accept that she chose a violent man to be her life partner. Especially when she is reminded of the traumatic facts, she may feel bothered by these contradictory cognitions (Cantor & Price, 2007).
Overcoming cognitive dissonance in PTSD
Theoretically, there are three ways to deal with cognitive dissonance (coping styles) in the case of posttraumatic stress disorder (Young, 1997). The first option would be to change one’s behavior to match one’s beliefs about the world – but in the case of PTSD, where the traumatic experience has already taken place, this is no longer possible. The second option is to change one’s attitudes towards the traumatic experience, for example by creating erroneous cognitions like “It’s all my fault that my uncle abused me” or “All husbands beat their wives” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Cantor & Price, 2007) (let us call this the “justification method”). The third option is to reduce the weight of discrepant cognitions by, slowly but surely, removing the emotional tag from the memory (let us call this the “weight reduction method”) (Young, 1997; McLean & Foa, 2011).
	In treatments of PTSD, the weight reduction approach seems to be the preferred method: therapists aim to make PTSD patients remember their traumatic experiences without becoming pathologically anxious or emotional (Yehuda, 2002; American Psychiatric Association, 2013; McLean & Foa, 2011). To make this possible, however, patients must avoid the justification coping style. After all, justification obscures what the weight reduction method is trying to uncover and render acceptable: the fact that the experience of the patient is inconsistent with his or her other cognitions.
	It is sometimes problematic to avoid the justification coping style, as justification seems to be a common way of reducing dissonance. The famous Stockholm Syndrome, for example, is thought be the result of the justification method of overcoming trauma-related dissonance: there are cases in which hostages do not abhor their captor’s actions but in fact defend them up to the highest court, which can help reconcile their experiences with their image of justice in the world (Adorjan, Christensen, Kelly & Pawluch, 2012).
	If we look outside of the domain of traumatic experience, again we see that justification is a common method of reducing dissonance and achieving satisfaction with one’s past experiences or behavior. Recall the insufficient justification paradigms of cognitive dissonance research: participants who are paid little for a boring task start believing that the task was, in fact, quite entertaining (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg & Wheatly (1998) call this an effect of the “psychological immune system”: the system that keeps us happy under the pressure of inevitable inconsistencies.
	Disregarding the question whether the weight reduction method is actually better than the justification method in the case of PTSD, it is clear that they work against each other. And therefore, if one is to be successful at the weight reduction method, it helps if one is bad at justifying traumatic experience – or at least good at resisting the temptation to do so.
Does cognitive dissonance coping style predict PTSD treatment success?
One common form of therapy that stimulates the weight reduction method of overcoming trauma-related cognitive dissonance is prolonged exposure therapy (Boudewyns & Hyer, 1991). Treatment involves “repeatedly confronting feared thoughts, images, objects, situations or activities […] in order to reduce pathological fear, anxiety and other symptoms” (McLean & Foa, 2011). Van Minnen et al. (2002) state that prolonged exposure therapy is the preferred method of treating PTSD, although 25 to 45% of patients still suffer from PTSD after the treatment has ended.
	If justifying the traumatic experience obstructs weight reduction processes like prolonged exposure therapy, could it be the case that people who have a high tendency to use the justification coping style are less likely to recover from PTSD fully through such a treatment? This would mean that people who have high preference for consistency are less likely to successfully complete prolonged exposure therapy.
	Van Minnen and colleagues (2002) report a finding that hints at such a relationship. Although they find no factors to predict prolonged exposure therapy success other than PTSD symptom strenth and substance abuse, they do find a trend (p < 0.10) suggesting that the personality trait “rigidity” is correlated with treatment outcome. Rigidity, in this case, is measured by two questions of the obsessive-compulsive personality disorder section of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R (Spitzer, Williams & Gibbon, 1987): “Do you have very high standards about what is right and what is wrong?” and “Is it hard for you to let other people help you unless they agree to do things exactly the way you want?” (Ryder, Costa & Bagby, 2007).
	These questions are reminiscent of some of those in Cialdini, Trost and Newsom’s (1995) preference for consistency scale: e.g. “I typically prefer to do things in the same way” and  “It is important to me that my actions are consistent with my beliefs”. It is known that greater preference for consistency predicts greater attitude change (justification) a state of cognitive dissonance (Heitland & Bohner, 2010; Guadagno & Cialdini, 2010).
	To summarize, we know that preference for consistency leads to more justification in a state of cognitive dissonance and we know that rigidity, a construct related to preference for consistency, correlates with prolonged exposure treatment outcome. This evidence suggests that people with higher preference for consistency may be less successful in prolonged exposure treatment of PTSD. New research should measure preference for consistency in people planning to undergo such treatment in order to confirm or falsify this hypothesis. If it turns out that people with high preference for consistency have a harder time overcoming PTSD through the currently preferred methods, this knowledge could be used to assign differential therapy to these patient populations, making PTSD treatment more efficient and effective.
Does brain functioning predict PTSD treatment success?
If people with a high tendency to respond to cognitive dissonance with the justification coping style have a lower chance of successfully completing PTSD therapy, this relationship should be mirrored in findings from functional neuroimaging studies. Unfortunately, there is not much literature that can answer to this prediction. There are systematic reviews of neurobiological changes following posttraumatic stress disorder (Hull, 2002; Pitman et al., 2012), but these do not go so far as to make statements about neural factors interacting with personality traits or treatment outcome.




Cognitive dissonance reduction is a psychological mechanism that has been studied extensively since the 1950s. Knowledge of the neural mechanisms underlying it is taking shape, but these brain systems are not yet fully understood. The literature that is available on cognitive discrepancy, dissonance and attitude change hinges on a few key papers, and the findings from these papers have not been scrutinized extensively.
	Posttraumatic stress disorder is a psychiatric disorder that affects millions around the world with great loss of quality of life. A common form of treatment is prolonged exposure therapy, but this is not effective in all patients with PTSD. One possible explanation for the limited effect of the treatment is the different dissonance coping styles people can employ. Individuals with a tendency to use justification and attitude change to overcome cognitive dissonance might be less successful in prolonged exposure therapy, as this treatment form is based upon facing and accepting facts that are in contradiction with other cognitions. At present, not enough evidence is available to falsify or confirm the hypothesis that the way people process cognitive dissonance predicts PTSD treatment outcome.
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Box 1. Cognitive dissonance versus cognitive discrepancy
Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn, Sigelman & Johnson (2008) remind us that many presentations of the theory of cognitive dissonance have referred to two different constructs as “cognitive dissonance”. Harmon-Jones and colleagues refer to the one construct, that of two or more cognitions contradicting each other, as “cognitive discrepancy”. The other construct, the unpleasant emotive state arising from cognitive discrepancy, they call “cognitive dissonance”. An example, in their words: “The unpleasant emotive state of dissonance provides motivation to change one’s attitudes or engage in other discrepancy-reduction processes.” (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008, p.2)














^1	  From The Fables of Phaedrus Translated into English Verse by Christopher Smart (London, 1913).
